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I. Introduction 
Richard Schediwy and Laura Strauss were property owners 
who owned land along the Tulloch Reservoir near Copperopolis, 
California.1 The two obtained a permit to build a retaining wall 
and a dock along the reservoir, and they did so in 2004.2 On April 
21, 2004, Tri-Dam, the owner and operator of the Tulloch 
Hydroelectric Project, conducted a survey that concluded the 
retaining wall and the dock were built below the appropriate 
elevation level.3 Over the next several years, Tri-Dam, Schediwy, 
and Strauss attempted to resolve the matter but were 
unsuccessful.4 Seven years later, litigation ensued as Tri-Dam 
sought a permanent injunction that would effectively force 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Tri-Dam v. Schediwy, No. 1:11–CV–01141 AWI–SMS, 2011 WL 
6692587 at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2011) (describing the property in question 
owned by defendants Schediwy and Strauss). 
 2. See id. (discussing the construction of Schediwy’s dock). 
 3. See id. (“Defendants’ contractor built the retaining wall at the 504- to 
505-foot elevation contour, in violation of the permit . . . . Tri-Dam further 
alleges that the SMP requires that all shoreline protection devices be located 
above the 510-foot elevation contour level of Tulloch Reservoir.”). 
 4. See id. (“Over the course of the next several years, Tri-Dam and 
Defendants exchanged numerous communications attempting to resolve the 
matter . . . . The retaining wall, however, has never been corrected or 
removed.”). 
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Schediwy and Strauss to remove their dock.5 The litigation 
focused on whether a statute of limitations that was generally 
applicable to the government specifically applied to injunctive 
relief.6 Though the court eventually ruled in favor of Tri-Dam, the 
case highlighted the practical consequences of a current judicial 
split affecting a wide variety of actions initiated by the 
government.7 
In 1948, Congress passed 28 U.S.C. § 2462.8 That Act, which 
recodifies several pieces of prior legislation,9 states as follows: 
Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an action, 
suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, 
penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be 
entertained unless commenced within five years from the date 
when the claim first accrued if, within the same period, the 
offender or the property is found within the United States in 
order that proper service may be made thereon.10 
In line with Supreme Court precedent that reasons: “‘[i]n a 
country where not even treason can be prosecuted, after a lapse of 
three years, it could scarcely be supposed, that an individual would 
remain forever liable to a pecuniary forfeiture,’”11 § 2462 establishes 
                                                                                                     
 5. See id. at *5 
The [First Amended Complaint] seeks a permanent injunction: 
(1) prohibiting defendants from installing, possessing, or maintaining 
property within the Tri-Dam project boundary without seeking prior 
approval and obtaining a permit from Tri-Dam; (2) prohibiting 
Defendants from installing, possessing, or maintaining property 
within the Tri-Dam project boundary that is not in compliance with a 
permit obtained from Tri-Dam; and (3) requiring Defendants within 
ten days of the permanent injunction to submit plans to Tri-Dam for 
removal of the wall. 
 6. See id. at *6 (discussing the application of 28 U.S.C. § 2462 to Tri-
Dam’s claims for equitable relief). 
 7. See id. (finding that “Tri-Dam may seek equitable relief beyond the 
five-year statute of limitation in § 2462 because there is no concurrent legal 
remedy that would be barred by the statute”). 
 8. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2012). 
 9. See 3M Co. v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1453, 1458 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (tracing 
the origins of the Act through its prior iterations—28 U.S.C. § 791 and Revised 
Statutes § 1047, 18 Stat. 193—which were passed in 1911 and 1874, 
respectively). 
 10. 28 U.S.C. § 2462. 
 11. 3M Co., 17 F.3d at 1457 (quoting Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 
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a generally applicable statute of limitations for certain actions 
instigated by the U.S. government.12 Specifically, the statute of 
limitations period applies to actions brought by the federal 
government13 that are not controlled by other acts of Congress.14 As 
indicated by its plain language, the statute only applies to civil 
proceedings.15 
Due to the broad nature of the statute, it affects diverse types of 
litigation. For example, in 3M Co. v. Browner16 the U.S. Court of 
                                                                                                     
336, 341 (1805)). 
 12. See FEC v. Nat’l Republican Senatorial Comm., 877 F. Supp. 15, 17 
(D.D.C. 1995) (“Section 2462 provides a catch-all statute of limitations in 
situations where Congress did not specifically include a time limitations in the 
statute.”). 
 13. See Bertha Bldg. Corp. v. Nat’l Theatres Corp., 269 F.2d 785, 788–89 
(2d Cir. 1959) (“The federal statute of limitations for penal actions applies only 
to actions on behalf of the United States and qui tam actions.”); SEC v. 
Williams, 884 F. Supp. 28, 30 (D. Me. 1995) (“Courts have construed § 2462 as a 
general statute of limitations applicable ‘to the entire federal government.’” 
(quoting 3M Co., 17 F.3d at 1461)); United States v. Magnolia Motor & Logging 
Co., 208 F. Supp. 63, 65 (N.D. Cal. 1962) (“The legislative history, taken 
together with the specific language of § 2461, indicates an intent to limit the 
sections within Chapter 163 of the Judicial Code [including 28 U.S.C. § 2462] to 
violations of Acts of Congress, and not to include reference to state 
proceedings.”). 
 14. See Nat’l Republican Senatorial Comm., 877 F. Supp. at 17 (“Section 
2462 provides a catch-all statute of limitations in situations where Congress did 
not specifically include a time limitations in the statute.”). 
 15. See United States v. Memphis Retail Package Stores Ass’n, 334 F. 
Supp. 686, 688 (W.D. Tenn. 1971) (“After consideration of the statutory 
language and the tenor of the decisions interpreting both statutory provisions, 
the Court is of the opinion that 28 U.S.C. § 2462 is applicable only in those 
actions which involve civil fines and penalties as opposed to criminal fines.”). 
 16. 17 F.3d 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In 3M Co., the Minnesota Mining and 
Manufacturing Company (3M) learned that it had violated the Toxic Substance 
Control Act (TSCA) between August 1980 and July 1986. Id. at 1454. 3M 
subsequently self-reported the violations to the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) on September 16, 1986. Id. at 1455. The EPA filed an 
administrative complaint against 3M on September 2, 1988, seeking $1.3 
million in civil penalties under the TSCA. Id. Invoking § 2462, 3M argued that 
the statute barred prosecution of any infractions committed more than five 
years prior to the filing of EPA’s complaint. Id. The Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) found § 2462 not applicable because, in relevant part, the statute applied 
only to judicial, and not administrative, proceedings. Id. The ALJ subsequently 
entered judgment against 3M, which the company appealed. Id. The U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected the ALJ’s finding and held 
§ 2462 applicable in administrative proceedings. Id. at 1457. In doing so, the 
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Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that the statute 
applied to matters instigated by federal agencies.17 Consequently, 
analysis of § 2462 features prominently not only in diverse litigation 
matters, but also actions brought by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission,18 Federal Trade Commission,19 Federal Aviation 
Administration,20 and the Federal Election Commission,21 as well as 
various environmental proceedings.22 
                                                                                                     
court recognized that, although few courts had directly addressed the issue, 
decisions from other jurisdictions indicated the statute should, in fact, be 
applied to administrative proceedings. Id. at 1455–57. The court then reasoned 
that an agency’s adjudication of a civil penalty case readily fit within the 
description of an “action, suit or proceeding” as described by the statute. Id. at 
1456. Finally, the court concluded that an administrative agency’s adjudicatory 
action would fall within the scope of language contained in § 2462’s predecessor 
statutes. Id. 
 17. See id. at 1457 (“Given the reasons why we have statutes of limitations, 
there is no discernible rationale for applying § 2462 when the penalty action or 
proceeding is brought in a court, but not when it is brought in an administrative 
agency.”). 
 18. See, e.g., SEC v. Wyly, 788 F. Supp. 2d 92, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(“Section 21(d)(3) [of the Exchange Act] does not contain a statute of limitations. 
Therefore, the catch-all five-year statute of limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2462 . . . 
governs punitive relief sought by the SEC under section 21(d)(3).”); SEC v. 
Williams, 884 F. Supp. 28, 29 (D. Mass. 1995) (“This case presents an issue of 
first impression in the First Circuit: whether S.E.C. actions for an injunction 
and disgorgement are subject to the five-year statute of limitations of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2462, the general statute of limitations for government actions aimed at 
imposing a ‘fine, penalty, or forfeiture.’”). 
 19. See, e.g., FTC v. Lukens Steel Co., 454 F. Supp. 1182, 1185 n.2 (D.D.C. 
1978) (finding that in an action brought by the Federal Trade Commission “[t]he 
plaintiff’s recovery is limited to violations occurring within the five years prior 
to the date of the complaint, June 18, 1974, because the five-year statute of 
limitations for civil penalty actions, 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1970), is applicable”). 
 20. See, e.g., Coghlan v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 470 F.3d 1300, 1304 (11th 
Cir. 2006) (“We agree with the FAA that § 2462 did not apply to Coughlan’s 
revocation proceedings, and that even if it did, it did not preclude revocation of 
his ATP certificate.”). 
 21. See, e.g., FEC v. Nat’l Republican Senatorial Comm., 877 F. Supp. 15, 
17–19 (D.D.C. 1995) (applying § 2462 to alleged violations of the Federal 
Elections Campaign Act). 
 22. For examples of § 2462 applying to actions brought under the Clean Air 
Act, see, e.g., Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n, Inc. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 480 
F.3d 410, 415–16 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that § 2462 applied to actions brought 
under the Clean Air Act when the United States declined to raise sovereign 
immunity as a threshold defense); United States v. Walsh, 8 F.3d 659, 662 (9th 
Cir. 1993) (stating that because the Government’s action was for the 
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Although § 2462 generally applies to a wide range of matters, 
courts disagree as to the specific claims that should be subject to the 
federal statute of limitations. Particularly, the federal circuit courts 
of appeals disagree as to whether § 2462 bars only claims for legal 
relief, or whether § 2462 also bars claims for injunctive relief.23 This 
Note provides an in-depth look at the relevant circuit split and 
concludes that § 2462 does not bar claims for injunctive relief. 
Part II examines important legal principles applicable to an 
analysis of § 2462, focusing on the significance of the doctrines of 
laches, the concurrent remedy rule, and sovereign immunity.24 Part 
III discusses the varying approaches the U.S. Courts of Appeals for 
the Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have taken in 
applying § 2462 to claims for injunctive relief.25 Part IV argues that 
the plain language of § 2462 does not apply to claims for injunctive 
relief and rejects a case-by-case analysis of this issue that focuses on 
each individual injunction’s characteristics.26 Additionally, Part IV 
argues that courts have misapplied the concurrent remedy rule 
when they discuss whether § 2462 bars claims for injunctive relief.27 
Part V provides recommendations for how courts should treat 
claims for injunctive relief under § 2462.28 
                                                                                                     
enforcement of a civil penalty under the Clean Air Act, the appropriate statute 
of limitations was 28 U.S.C. § 2462). For examples of § 2462 applying to actions 
brought under the Clean Water Act, see, e.g., Pub. Interest Research Grp. of 
N.J., Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 73–77 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(ruling that § 2462 applies to citizens suits brought under the Clean Water Act); 
Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834 F.2d 1517, 1521 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(“Application of section 2462 to citizen enforcement suits [brought under the 
Clean Water Act] is in keeping with the language of the statute; a citizen 
enforcement suit is also an ‘action . . . for the enforcement of [a] civil fine.’” 
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2012))). 
 23. Infra Part III. 
 24. Infra Part II. 
 25. Infra Part III. 
 26. Infra Part IV. 
 27. Infra Part IV. 
 28. Infra Part V. 
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II. Analysis of the Doctrines of Laches, the Concurrent Remedy 
Rule, and the Government’s Sovereign Immunity 
A. Laches 
Before discussing whether the statute of limitations 
contained in § 2462 should apply to claims for injunctive—as well 
as legal—relief, it is helpful to consider the types of time 
restrictions that bar suits in American common law. Under the 
American common law system, specific statutes of limitations 
govern actions at law, while the doctrine of laches controls suits 
in equity.29 Because this Note focuses on whether § 2462 should 
control claims for injunctive relief, a traditional equitable 
remedy,30 it is necessary to examine the doctrine of laches and its 
application. 
The doctrine of laches stems from the equitable maxim 
“equity aids the vigilant.”31 Historically, chancery courts 
established the doctrine of laches because statutes of limitation 
did not apply in equitable courts.32 The doctrine primarily holds 
that equitable claims “must be asserted in a reasonable time, or 
equitable relief will be refused.”33 Because laches is a doctrine 
                                                                                                     
 29. See DOUG RENDLEMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: INJUNCTIONS, STRUCTURAL 
REMEDIES, AND CONTEMPT 250 (2010) (“American law has two time bars: the 
statute of limitations for a common-law action and . . . the judge-made doctrine 
of laches for an [e]quitable remedy.”). 
 30. See DAN. B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION 9 
(2d ed. 1993) (“The damages remedy was historically a legal remedy. The 
injunction and most other coercive remedies were equitable.”). 
 31. See JAMES W. EATON, HANDBOOK OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 52 (1901) 
(stating that “[e]quity aids the vigilant, not the indolent”); RENDLEMAN, supra 
note 29, at 251 (stating the maxim as “[e]quity aids the vigilant, not those who 
slumber in their rights”). 
 32. See RENDLEMAN, supra note 29, at 251 (“Chancery courts developed 
laches because [e]quity lacked a statute of limitations.”). 
 33. EATON, supra note 31, at 53; see also Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280, 287 
(1940) (“[E]quity, in the absence of any statute of limitations made applicable to 
equity suits, has provided its own rule of limitations through the doctrine of 
laches, the principle that equity will not aid a plaintiff whose unexcused delay, 
if the suit were allowed, would be prejudicial to the defendant.”); A.C. 
Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1028–29 (Fed. Cir. 
1992) (“In a legal context, laches may be defined as the neglect or delay in 
bringing suit to remedy an alleged wrong, which taken together with laps of 
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sounding in equity, it generally bars equitable claims regardless 
of whether a statute of limitations bars the corresponding legal 
claim for relief.34 Further, because laches is an equitable doctrine, 
its enforcement is typically less rigid than enforcement of an 
analogous statute of limitation.35 Finally, laches is the standard 
time bar for injunctions.36 
Both the doctrine of laches and statutes of limitation advance 
numerous public policies. Specifically, these time bars promote 
the policies of “repose, elimination of stale claims, and certainty 
about a plaintiff’s opportunity for recovery and a defendant’s 
potential liabilities.”37 Thus, these time restrictions foster just 
results by ensuring that evidence remains reliable and that all 
litigants are aware of their rights.38  
                                                                                                     
time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the adverse party and 
operates as an equitable bar.”); Lake Dev. Enters., Inc. v. Kojetinsky, 410 
S.W.2d 361, 367 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966) (“Laches is the neglect for an unreasonable 
and unexplained length of time under circumstances permitting diligence, to do 
what in law, should have been done.”). 
 34. See RENDLEMAN, supra note 29, at 251 (“‘[A] court of equity may refuse 
relief on the ground of laches although the pursuit of a legal remedy on the 
same cause would not be barred by the applicable statute of limitations . . . .’” 
(quoting WILLIAM DE FUNIAK, A HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY 42 (2d ed. 1956))). 
 35. See Lake Dev. Enters. Inc., 410 S.W.2d at 367–68 (“There is no fixed 
period within which a person must assert his claim or be barred by laches. The 
length of time depends upon circumstances of the particular case.”); see also 
RENDLEMAN, supra note 29, at 250 (“The statute of limitations is a fixed period, 
ostensibly a rigid, and arbitrary all-or-nothing rule. The court-made rules that 
comprise laches require both plaintiff’s unreasonable delay and defendant’s 
prejudice; these imprecise factors and the chancellor’s discretion create 
individualized, flexible, and contextual decisions.”). 
 36. See RENDLEMAN, supra note 29, at 250 (listing injunctions, specific 
performance, and constructive trusts as types of equitable remedies generally 
controlled by the doctrine of laches). 
 37.  Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 555 (2000). 
 38. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985) (“Just determinations of 
fact cannot be made when, because of the passage of time, the memories of 
witnesses have faded or evidence is lost. In compelling circumstances, even 
wrongdoers are entitled to assume that their sins may be forgotten.”). 
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B. Concurrent Remedy Rule 
As discussed above,39 the doctrine of laches often applies to 
claims for equitable relief even when the expiration of the 
relevant statute of limitations renders a related legal claim not 
actionable. The concurrent remedy rule describes the interplay 
between concurrent legal and equitable claims affected by a time 
bar. In its decision in Cope v. Anderson,40 the Supreme Court 
described the rule: 
Even though these suits are in equity, the states’ statutes of 
limitations apply. For it is only the scope of the relief sought 
and the multitude of parties sued which gives equity 
concurrent jurisdiction to enforce the legal obligation here 
asserted. And equity will withhold its relief in such a case 
where the applicable statute of limitations would bar the 
concurrent legal remedy.41 
The concurrent remedy rule states that if the expiration of a 
statute of limitations bars a legal claim, then a “concurrent” 
equitable claim should be barred as well.42 Consequently, courts 
                                                                                                     
 39. Supra Part II.A. 
 40. 331 U.S. 461 (1947). In Cope, the plaintiff brought equitable suits in the 
federal district courts of Ohio and Pennsylvania, attempting to enforce 
assessments against resident stockholders of a debtor bank. Id. at 463. The 
Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Third Circuits disagreed upon whether the 
state statutes of limitations should bar the equitable actions, and the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari in order to decide the issue. Id. First, utilizing the 
concurrent remedy rule, the Court determined that the state statutes of 
limitations applied to these suits in equity. Id. The Court then considered 
whether a five-year statute of limitations in Kentucky should bar the actions 
due to “borrowing statutes” promulgated in Ohio and Pennsylvania, which 
required that courts “bar suits against [that state’s] resident if the right to sue 
him had already expired in another state where the combination of 
circumstances giving rise to the right to sue had taken place.” Id. at 466. 
Because the debtor bank was authorized only to conduct business in Louisville, 
Kentucky, the Court concluded that the cause of action arose in Kentucky. Id. at 
467. Thus, the Court ruled that the Kentucky cause of action barred the 
plaintiff’s equitable claims for relief. Id. at 468. 
 41. Id. at 463–64. 
 42. See Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280, 289 (1940) (“Even though there is no 
state statute applicable to similar equitable demands, when the jurisdiction of 
the federal court is concurrent with that of law . . . equity will withhold its 
remedy if the legal right is barred by the local statute of limitations.”); Williams 
v. Walsh, 558 F.2d 667, 671 (2d. Cir. 1977) (“The distinction between different 
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must consider whether an equitable claim is “concurrent” with a 
legal claim when they evaluate the applicability of the concurrent 
remedy rule. 
Whether an equitable claim is concurrent with a 
corresponding legal claim centers on the jurisdictional division of 
the Anglo-American judicial system. In medieval England, two 
distinct courts—the Court at Law and the Court at Equity—
comprised the judicial system.43 The Court at Equity, also called 
the Court at Chancery, developed in order to provide a more 
flexible legal approach than the Court at Law employed.44 
Because the Court at Equity developed specifically to foster just 
results,45 the legal issues that fell under the jurisdiction of this 
court were fundamentally different than those adjudicated in the 
Court at Law.46 Vestiges of this jurisdictional distinction remain 
today, as “[c]ontemporary ‘equitable’ substantive subjects include 
                                                                                                     
causes of action and different remedies is important, however, because, in 
contrast to the true independence of limitations periods controlling different 
causes of action, the limitations periods governing two concurrent remedies, one 
legal and the other equitable, are not independent of one another.”); see also 
GEORGE L. CLARK, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 31 n.4 (1919) (“Where an equity court 
applies the statute of limitations by analogy, it is not necessary to plead the 
statute . . . . Where law and equity jurisdictions are strictly concurrent, equity 
courts consider themselves bound by the statute.”); EATON, supra note 31, at 53–
54 (“Courts of equity, in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, consider themselves 
bound by the statutes of limitation which govern courts of law in like cases . . . 
because, where the legal remedy is barred, the spirit of the statute bars the 
equitable remedy also.”). 
 43. See DOUG RENDLEMAN, REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 5 (2011) 
(discussing the effects the dual judicial system had upon a plaintiff’s remedial 
opportunities). 
 44. See id. at 264 (“Medieval Chancery was a separate judicial system 
developed by the Chancellors in response to rigid or unsatisfactory legal rules. 
Early Chancellors prided themselves on the flexibility to dispense with legal 
rules that created justice.”); Patrick Devlin, Equity, Due Process and the Seventh 
Amendment: A Commentary on the Zenith Case, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1571, 1572 
(1983) (stating that “equity created the greater part of its jurisdiction by 
abstractions from the common law”). 
 45. See Devlin, supra note 44, at 1572 (explaining that, historically, a 
plaintiff had to demonstrate the court at law was acting unjustly to be heard by 
the Chancellor). 
 46. See RENDLEMAN, supra note 43, at 264. (“Today several substantive 
fields are classified as equitable because the medieval Chancellors developed 
them. The Chancellors’ most important substantive contributions were to trusts, 
mortgages, and bankruptcy.”). 
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quiet title, partition, liens and mortgages, trusts, fiduciaries, 
guardianships, dissolution of marriages, and adoptions.”47 
Moreover, modern courts categorize possible remedies for 
plaintiffs as either “equitable” or “legal.”48 Equitable remedies, 
such as an injunction or specific performance, were available in 
the Court at Equity, while the legal remedy of damages was 
available in the Court at Law.49 
Considering the historic division of the Courts at Law and 
Equity, the meaning of “concurrent remedy” becomes clearer: 
equitable remedies and legal remedies are concurrent when a 
court can award either type of remedy in a particular action.50 
Said another way, the concurrent remedy rule applies when a 
court has jurisdiction to adjudicate both legal and equitable 
matters.51 
Because the modern American legal system merges the 
distinct courts of law and equity into one court, the existence of 
concurrent jurisdiction is extremely common.52 Courts exercising 
general jurisdiction have the power to adjudicate both legal and 
equitable matters.53 In fact, prominent legal scholar Zechariah 
                                                                                                     
 47. Id. 
 48. See id. (discussing the distinctions between legal and equitable 
remedies in the modern American legal system). 
 49. See id. (discussing equitable, as opposed to legal, remedies). 
 50. See id. (“In these concurrent areas, a court may award a successful 
plaintiff an injunction or compensatory damages, sometimes both.”). 
 51. See Devlin, supra note 44, at 1573–74 (“Thus, in addition to exclusive 
equity, in which there was never any suit at common law at all, there arose 
what came to be called concurrent equity made up of suits at common law that, 
in effect, the Chancellor decided himself.”). 
 52. See Susan Poser, Termination of Desegregation Decrees and the Elusive 
Meaning of Unitary Status, 81 NEB. L. REV. 283, 312 (2002) 
The merger of law and equity meant that ordinary legal rights, which 
otherwise would have been cognizable in law courts that had 
previously lacked jurisdiction over equitable remedies, had the 
benefit of such remedies. Equity no longer could be defined as the 
ability of a certain court to create a remedy for a theretofore 
unrecognized right, but now meant the ability of all courts, including 
the federal courts, to use the remedies that once were the province of 
equity courts in any dispute that they determined deserved such 
treatment and which met the qualifications established by the courts. 
 53. See RENDLEMAN, supra note 43, at 264 (“Today a court with general 
jurisdiction decides what used to be called actions at law and suits in equity.”). 
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Chafee, Jr. argued that traditional equity jurisdiction was 
dependent not on judicial power, but rather on judicial discretion 
and restraint.54 Chafee argued that a trial judge always has the 
power, or jurisdiction, to issue both legal and equitable remedies 
as he deems appropriate.55 Thus, according to Chafee, legal and 
equitable jurisdictions are always concurrent.56 Although 
Chafee’s view of the complete fusion of legal and equitable 
jurisdiction may be extreme, it is widely accepted that courts 
have concurrent jurisdiction in many legal areas, such as 
contracts, torts, property, and constitutional law.57 Thus, for the 
purposes of this Note, it is assumed that the courts discussed 
have concurrent jurisdiction to award both legal and equitable 
remedies. 
Once a court has concurrent jurisdiction to adjudicate both 
legal and equitable matters, the concurrent remedy rule applies. 
Although the text of the rule may seem unclear or confusing, the 
rule simply reflects the impact that a statute of limitations has on 
proving a claim of laches. The concurrent remedy rule states 
“equity will withhold its relief in such a case where the applicable 
                                                                                                     
 54. See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 304 (1950) (“The 
opposite view, which I shall advocate as desirable, is that today, with law and 
equity merged in a single court, ‘equity jurisdiction’ like exercise of jurisdiction 
is simply a bundle of sound principles of decision concerning particular kinds of 
relief.”); see also RENDLEMAN, supra note 43, at 264–65 (“Properly answered 
today these questions are addressed to the judge’s wisdom and fairness, not to 
the judge’s basic power to decide . . . . In other words, the court’s ‘equity 
jurisdiction’ is not jurisdictional.”). 
 55. See CHAFEE, supra note 54, at 304 (“‘If the court has jurisdiction of the 
subject matter and of the parties nothing further is required’ to make the decree 
an order which must be obeyed . . . . If the court gives specific relief contrary to 
all the precedents, that is merely reversible error and not absence of power.” 
(quoting O’Brien v. People, 216 Ill. 354, 363 (1905))). 
 56. See id. at 304–05 
In other words, when a suit for some kind of specific relief is brought 
in a regular trial court and the parties are properly served or appear 
voluntarily . . . then in my opinion the judge has power to decide, 
rightly or wrongly, whether to give the relief sought or a different 
kind of relief or no relief at all. 
 57. See RENDLEMAN, supra note 43, at 264 (“Equitable remedies, an 
injunction or specific performance, and the legal remedy, damages, are 
‘concurrently’ available to plaintiffs in contracts, torts, property, and 
constitutional law.”). 
IS TIME UP FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF? 2461 
statute of limitations would bar the concurrent legal remedy.”58 
This language corresponds with the notion that a court’s 
dismissal of a claim due to a statute of limitations bar evidences a 
proper dismissal of any corresponding equitable claims on the 
grounds of laches.59 Consequently, the concurrent remedy rule 
does not indicate a statute of limitations intended to control legal 
relief should apply directly to equitable relief. Instead, the rule 
provides that the expiration of a statute of limitations should be 
used as powerful evidence of laches. In this way, equity still 
withholds its relief, but the statute of limitations does not directly 
apply to the equitable claim. 
C. Statutes of Limitations and the Government’s Sovereign 
Immunity 
1. General Rule 
In addition to considering the doctrine of laches and the 
concurrent remedy rule, it is crucial to understand how a 
government action affects the application of statutes of 
limitation.60 The general rule regarding statutes of limitation and 
the government is that “the government is not subject to any time 
constraints in bringing its actions.”61 This rule stems from the 
                                                                                                     
 58. Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 464 (1947). 
 59. Harvard Law Review Ass’n, Developments in the Law Statutes of 
Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1184 (1950) 
In the absence of a controlling statute, courts enforcing rights 
formerly cognizable in equity are still free to exercise discretion in 
determining where the plaintiff should be barred. However, in areas 
of concurrent jurisdiction with courts of law, equity has usually 
considered the passage of time equivalent to the comparable statute 
of limitations as presumptive of laches. 
See also CLARK, supra note 42, at 31 (“[E]xcept in recent years [statutes of 
limitations] have applied only to common law actions and not to suits in equity, 
but equity courts have been accustomed, in the absence of special 
circumstances, to apply the statute to equity suits by way of analogy.”).  
 60. See supra Part I (discussing § 2462 as it applies to actions brought by 
the government, including actions brought by administrative agencies). 
 61. Mary V. Laitos et al., Equitable Defenses Against the Government in the 
Natural Resources and Environmental Law Context, 17 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 273, 
302 (2000); see also Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 132 
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legal maxim quod nullum tempus occurrit regi, which literally 
means “no time runs against the King.”62 Historically, the 
doctrine of nullum tempus grew from the common law principles 
that justified the sovereign immunity of the government.63 
English courts reasoned that because the crown could not be 
guilty of general negligence, it could not be guilty of negligent 
delay.64 Courts justified this doctrine by claiming it prevented the 
loss of public rights and property due to the negligence of crown 
officials.65  
Although these policy justifications for the doctrine of nullum 
tempus, rooted in the power of the English monarch, may seem 
inadequate today, additional modern considerations also support 
the doctrine.66 Specifically, “the rule is supportable now because 
its benefit and advantage extends to every citizen . . . whose pleas 
of laches or limitation it precludes.”67 In sum, the general rule 
that statutes of limitations do not apply against the government 
is widely accepted.68 
Despite this wide acceptance, an important caveat applies to 
the statute of limitations imposed by § 2462. Namely, the 
                                                                                                     
(1938) (stating that the “sovereign is exempt from the consequences of its laches, 
and from the operation of statutes of limitations”). 
 62. See Joseph Mack, Nullum Tempus: Governmental Immunity to Statutes 
of Limitations, Laches, and Statutes of Repose, 73 DEF. COUNS. J. 180, 180 
(2006) (describing the meaning of the nullum tempus doctrine). 
 63. See id. at 185–86 (describing the relationship between the doctrines of 
sovereign immunity and nullum tempus). 
 64. See id. (“The crown could not be negligent, and therefore could not 
suffer from any negligent delay, just as [it] could not suffer for negligently 
causing its citizens injury.”). 
 65. See id. (“Thus, the ‘great public policy of preserving the public rights, 
revenues and property from injury and loss, [sic] by the negligence of public 
officers’ justifies immunity to statutes of limitations, just as it had justified 
sovereign immunity.” (quoting United States v. Hoar, 26 F. Cas. 329, 330 
(C.C.D. Mass. 1821))). 
 66. See id. at 186 (“[N]ullum tempus has evolved its own policy 
justifications that are separate from, but nevertheless close to, the policies 
driving sovereign immunity.”). 
 67. Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 133 (1938). 
 68. See id. at 134 (“So complete has been [the general rule’s] acceptance 
that the implied immunity of the domestic ‘sovereign,’ state or national, has 
been universally deemed to be an exception to local statutes of limitations where 
the government, state or national, is not expressly included . . . .”). 
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doctrine of nullum tempus does not apply if the legislature 
specifically indicates otherwise.69 This caveat to the general rule 
is important because § 2462 is a statute of limitations created by 
Congress with the explicit intention that it apply to government 
action.70 Thus, the statute of limitations contained in § 2462 
applies to claims brought by the government. Even though the 
absolute bar does not apply to § 2462, it is helpful to consider the 
law’s unfavorable treatment of statutes of limitation against the 
government when discussing whether § 2462 applies to claims for 
equitable relief.  
Moreover, nullum tempus applies to the defense of laches as 
well.71 Thus, unless Congress specifically indicates otherwise, a 
laches defense should not be used against the government. The 
text of § 2462 does not explicitly mention laches.72 As a result, 
laches should not be used against the government to bar 
injunctive relief pursuant to § 2462, even though a similar action 
barring a legal claim may be proper. This interpretation of § 2462 
supports the traditional position that the defense of laches should 
not be used against the government acting in its sovereign 
capacity.73  
                                                                                                     
 69. See United States v. Weintraub, 613 F.2d 612, 619 (6th Cir. 1979) 
(“While the general rule . . . is that the sovereign is exempt from the operation of 
statutes of limitations, an exception to that general rule exists when the 
sovereign (through the legislature) expressly imposes a limitation period upon 
itself.”); State v. City of Columbia, 528 S.E.2d 408, 412 (S.C. 2000) (“Under the 
nullum tempus doctrine, statutes of limitation do not run against the sovereign 
unless the [l]egislature specifically provides otherwise.”). 
 70. See Teresa A. Holderer, Enforcement of TSCA and the Federal Five-
Year Statute of Limitations for Penalty Actions, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1032 
(1993) (describing § 2462 as a statute of limitation that “clearly include[s] the 
government”). 
 71. See United States v. Insley, 130 U.S. 263, 266 (1889) (“This doctrine is 
applicable with equal force, not only to the question of a statute of limitations in 
a suit at law, but also to the question of laches in a suit in equity.”). 
 72. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2012). 
 73. See United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414, 416 (1940) (“It is well 
settled that the United States is not bound by state statutes of limitation or 
subject to the defense of laches in enforcing its rights.”); United States v. 
Thompson, 98 U.S. 486, 489 (1878) (“Laches, however gross, cannot be imputed 
to [the United States government].”); DOBBS, supra note 30, at 75–76 (stating 
that laches may not be invoked to defeat the public interest). 
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2. Statutory Construction 
The law shows its disfavor of statutes of limitation barring 
government action through statutory construction. When a court 
determines that a statute of limitation should accrue against the 
government, it will strictly construe the statute in favor of the 
government.74 Courts strictly construe these statutes by reading 
the statute closely, narrowly interpreting its language, and 
choosing a meaning that favors the government when two 
possible statutory interpretations exist.75 Like the bar against 
statutes of limitation running against the government, the strict 
statutory construction of these statutes in favor of the 
government is not absolute. This rule of statutory construction 
does not apply when the statute is explicitly intended for use 
against the government.76 In fact, some scholars argue that 
§ 2462 should not be entitled to a strict construction because 
Congress wrote the statute with the express purpose of 
controlling government action.77 However, because § 2462 does 
not expressly apply to actions for injunctive relief, the statutory 
language should be strictly construed for purposes of this 
analysis. 
                                                                                                     
 74. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 456, 462 (1924) 
(“Statutes of limitation sought to be applied to bar rights of the government, 
must receive a strict construction in favor of the government.”); Holderer, supra 
note 70, at 1031 (“As a corollary to government immunity, courts accept that 
statutes of limitations that purportedly apply to the government must be strictly 
construed in its favor.”). 
 75. See Holderer, supra note 70, at 1031 (“[Strict construction] means that 
courts will read the statute closely and rigidly and will not broaden the statute’s 
reach by implication. Further, where a statute is susceptible to more than one 
interpretation, courts will choose the reading which favors the government.”). 
 76. See id. at 1032 (“‘Where a statute expressly includes the government 
there is no room for the operation of the strict construction rule, and a statute of 
this nature, like any other, is entitled to receive a sensible and reasonable 
treatment.’” (quoting 3 SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 62.02 (4th ed. 
1986))).  
 77. See id. (“But, even if strict construction of statutes of limitations in 
favor of the government persists, it should not be invoked when considered 
section 2462’s application to a governmental penalty action.”). 
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III. Circuit Splits 
A. Eleventh Circuit 
United States v. Banks78 is the leading case in the Eleventh 
Circuit advocating that § 2462 should not bar claims for 
injunctive relief. In Banks, Park Banks purchased three lots 
located in Big Pine Key, Florida in 1980.79 Banks began to fill the 
lots, and in March 1983 an Army Corps of Engineers biologist 
“informed Banks that parts of [his lots] were wetlands and that 
discharges onto those areas were unlawful without a permit.”80 
Section 1344(a) of the Clean Water Act (CWA)81 gives the 
Secretary of the Army power to issue permits for the “discharge of 
dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified 
disposal sites.”82 In April 1983, the “Corps issued a cease and 
desist order, threatening enforcement action if Banks continued 
his discharges.”83 The Army Corps of Engineers then denied 
Banks’s application for an “after-the-fact permit,” and informed 
Banks that “to avoid an enforcement action, he [would need to] 
negotiate a restoration plan with them.”84 Banks failed to 
negotiate such a plan and continued to discharge fill onto his 
property.85 Furthermore, Banks acquired additional property in 
1988, on which he added fill.86 
In 1991, after issuing Banks four additional cease and desist 
orders, the Government filed suit against Banks, seeking an 
injunction as well as a civil penalty.87 Banks challenged the suit, 
                                                                                                     
 78. 115 F.3d 916 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 79. See id. at 917 (describing relevant facts and background information of 
the case). 
 80. Id. at 918. 
 81. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012). 
 82. Id. § 1344(a). 
 83. Banks, 115 F.3d at 918. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See id. (describing early interactions between Banks and the Army 
Corps of Engineers). 
 86. See id. (noting that from 1988 to 1991 Banks continued to discharge fill 
on his property and prepare additional lots for coconut farming). 
 87. See id. 
In December 1991, the government filed this suit against Banks, 
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partly on the grounds that § 2462 barred the government from 
seeking relief, both in the form of an injunction and civil penalty, 
for actions conducted outside of the five-year period.88 The 
Government argued that § 2462 should not apply to the 
injunctive relief because “‘statutes of limitations are not 
controlling measures of equitable relief.’”89 In contrast, Banks 
argued that § 2462 applied to claims for equitable relief due to the 
concurrent remedy rule.90 
Agreeing with the Government, the Eleventh Circuit 
concluded “that the concurrent remedy rule cannot properly be 
invoked against the government when it seeks equitable relief in 
its official enforcement capacity.”91 In its analysis, the court relied 
on the “well-established rule that ‘an action on behalf of the United 
States in its governmental capacity . . . is subject to no time 
limitation, in the absence of congressional enactment clearly 
imposing it.’”92 Additionally, the court cited the canon of statutory 
construction that “any statute of limitations sought to be applied 
against the United States ‘must receive a strict construction in 
favor of the Government.’”93 The court determined that “absent a 
clear expression of Congress to the contrary, a statute of limitation 
does not apply to claims brought by the federal government in its 
                                                                                                     
requesting that the district court enjoin future discharge of additional 
dredged or fill materials into the wetlands on the property, require 
Banks to restore the wetlands to their undisturbed condition before 
such unlawful discharge by removing the fill and otherwise 
implementing a restoration plan, and require Banks to pay an 
appropriate civil penalty. 
 88. See id. at 918 (stating that while both parties agreed that § 2462 
applied to the CWA, they disagreed as to “the applicability of this statute of 
limitations to claims for equitable relief”). 
 89. Id. at 919 (citing Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946)). 
 90. See id. (discussing the tenets of the concurrent remedy rule). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 456, 462 
(1924)); United States v. Alvarado, 5 F.3d 1425, 1427 (11th Cir. 1993). 
Moreover, the court specifically addressed the importance of the United States 
acting in its governmental capacity, stating “[t]he statute is enforced against the 
government only when the government is acting to vindicate private interests, 
not a sovereign or public interest.” Id. 
 93. United States v. Banks, 115 F.3d 916, 919 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting 
Alvarado, 5 F.3d at 1428). 
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sovereign capacity.”94 The court then concluded that § 2462 did not 
apply to claims of injunctive relief because there existed no clear 
expression of congressional intent in the statutory language 
indicating that § 2462 should indeed bar these equitable claims.95 
B. Ninth Circuit 
Federal Election Committee v. Williams96 is the leading Ninth 
Circuit case arguing that § 2462 should bar claims for injunctive 
relief. The Federal Election Committee (FEC) investigated Larry 
Williams for alleged violations of election laws during the 1988 
presidential election campaign.97 Williams’s alleged violations 
occurred between the autumn of 1987 and January of 1988; 
however, the FEC did not file suit until October 19, 1993, at 
which time it sought the enforcement of civil penalties as well as 
declaratory and injunctive relief.98  
Williams filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the FEC 
filed its complaint after the five-year statute of limitations 
contained in § 2462 had expired.99 The district court denied 
Williams’s motion and granted partial summary judgment in 
favor of the FEC.100 Williams appealed the decision, at which 
time the FEC argued that “§ 2462 does not apply to actions for 
injunctive relief.”101 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the FEC’s 
argument contradicted the Supreme Court’s decision in Cope, 
which enforced the concurrent remedy rule.102 In doing so, the 
                                                                                                     
 94. Id. 
 95. See id. (“Because Congress did not expressly indicate otherwise in the 
statutory language of section 2462, its provisions apply only to civil penalties; 
the government’s equitable claims against Banks are not barred.”). 
 96. 104 F.3d 237 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 97. See id. at 239 (describing the factual background of the Williams case). 
 98. See id. (describing the factual background of the Williams case).  
 99. See id. (“Williams argues that [§ 2462] applies on its face to FEC suits 
to impose civil penalties.”). 
 100. See id. (“The district court denied Williams’ motion to dismiss on 
limitations grounds and partially granted FEC’s motion for summary judgment 
on January 31, 1995.”).  
 101. Id. at 240. 
 102. See id. (“Cope holds that ‘equity will withhold its relief in such a case 
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Ninth Circuit stated, “because the claim for injunctive relief is 
connected to the claim for legal relief, the statute of limitations 
applies to both.”103 The Ninth Circuit ultimately decided that all 
of the FEC’s claims were untimely filed and reversed the district 
court’s decision in favor of Williams.104 Although the court in 
Williams does not address its acceptance of the concurrent 
remedy rule in great detail, this case provides a clear example of 
a court holding that § 2462 applies to claims for both injunctive 
and legal relief. 
C. Tenth Circuit and Fifth Circuit 
As discussed above, the Eleventh Circuit fundamentally 
rejected the notion that § 2462 applies to injunctive relief, while 
the Ninth Circuit adopted the concurrent remedy rule without 
significant explanation.105 The Tenth and Fifth Circuits, however, 
undertook an in-depth analysis of § 2462 and adopted a more 
nuanced approach when deciding whether the statute of 
limitations should apply to claims for injunctive relief. 
1. Tenth Circuit 
The most significant case on this issue in the Tenth Circuit is 
United States v. Telluride Co.106 In Telluride, the United States 
alleged that Telluride Co. (Telco) had violated provisions of the 
Clean Water Act and subsequently filed suit on October 15, 
1993.107 The Government claimed that Telco had illegally filled 
approximately forty-five acres of wetland between 1981 and 1989, 
                                                                                                     
where the applicable statute of limitations would bar the concurrent legal 
remedy.’”(quoting Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 464 (1947)). 
 103. Id. 
 104. See id. at 241 (finding that the FEC’s suit was “untimely and should 
have been dismissed”).  
 105. Supra Parts III.A–B. 
 106. 146 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 107. See id. at 1243 (“On October 15, 1993, the United States filed a civil 
action against Telco in the United States District Court for the District of 
Colorado under § 309 of the Clean Water Act, 33. U.S.C. § 1319.”). 
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and sought civil monetary penalties and injunctive relief.108 
Specifically, the Government “sought to enjoin Telco from 
discharging additional material, and to require Telco to restore 
damaged wetlands to their prior condition or create new wetland 
to replace those that could not be restored.”109 
Telco then filed a motion for partial summary judgment on 
the Government’s claims for violations that occurred before 
October 15, 1988, arguing that the five-year statute of limitations 
contained in § 2462 barred these actions.110 Although the 
Government conceded that the statute of limitations prohibited 
claims for civil penalties, it argued that § 2462 did not apply to 
claims for injunctive relief and, thus, their equitable claims were 
not barred.111 The district court, however, applied the concurrent 
remedy rule and withheld the Government’s claim for injunctive 
relief because § 2462 barred its claims for civil penalties.112 
The Government appealed the district court’s decision, 
arguing that the court “erred in applying § 2462 to bar its claims 
for equitable relief, because the ruling is contrary to the well-
settled principles restricting the applications of time limitations 
against the government, and is contrary to the plain language of 
the statute.”113 As the Eleventh Circuit did in Banks, the Tenth 
Circuit interpreted the language of § 2462 narrowly.114 The court 
                                                                                                     
 108. See id. (discussing the background facts of the case). 
 109. Id. 
 110. See id. (“Telco subsequently filed a motion for partial summary 
judgment on all of the Government’s claims for violations that occurred before 
October 15, 1988, contending these claims were barred by the five-year statute 
of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2462.”). 
 111. See id. (“The Governnment conceded § 2462 applied to its claim for civil 
penalties, but argued the statute did not bar its claims for injunctive relief.”). 
 112. See id. at 1243–44 (“Consequently, because § 2462 barred the 
Government’s claims for legal relief, civil monetary penalties, the court held 
§ 2462 barred the Government’s claims for injunctive relief.”). 
 113. Id. at 1244. 
 114. See id. at 1244–45 
We interpret § 2462 narrowly because “an action on behalf of the 
United States in its governmental capacity . . . is subject to no time 
limitation, in the absence of congressional enactment clearly 
imposing it.” In addition, “statutes of limitation sought to be applied 
to bar rights of the government, must receive a strict construction in 
favor of the government.” (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. 
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then conducted a thorough analysis focusing on the statutory 
construction of § 2462, departing from the Eleventh Circuit’s 
discussion.115 The court primarily focused on whether the phrase 
“pecuniary or otherwise” modified only the term “forfeiture,” as 
claimed by the Government, or whether it modified the term 
“penalty” as well.116 Citing previously amended versions of 
§ 2462, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the term “pecuniary or 
otherwise” should modify both “penalty” and “forfeiture.”117 
Likewise, the court then construed § 2462 “as applying to non-
monetary penalties.”118 
The Tenth Circuit next addressed the Government’s claim 
that the “plain language of § 2462 does not apply to claims for 
equitable relief.”119 In doing so, the court recognized that “actions 
for equitable relief typically are not actions for penalties or 
fines,”120 and that “‘statutes of limitation are not controlling 
measures of equitable relief.’”121 Telco, however, argued that the 
proposed injunction was a nonmonetary penalty and, therefore, 
was subject to the statute of limitations imposed by § 2462.122 
Because § 2462 did not contain a definition for the term 
“penalty,” the court conducted its own analysis, concluding that a 
penalty, for the purpose of § 2462, was “a sanction or punishment 
imposed for violating a public law which goes beyond 
compensation for the injury caused by the defendant.”123 
Moreover, the court focused its definition of penalty on “whether 
the sanction seeks compensation unrelated to, or in excess, of the 
                                                                                                     
Davis, 264 U.S. 456, 462 (1924) (citations omitted)). 
 115. See id. at 1245 (discussing statutory interpretation of § 2462).  
 116. See id. (discussing statutory interpretation of § 2462). 
 117. See id. (“Based on this construction, we view ‘pecuniary or otherwise’ as 
modifying both the terms penalty and forfeiture.”). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. (quoting Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946)). 
 122. See id. (“Telco contends the restorative injunction is a penalty under 
§ 2462 since it imposes a sanction for violating a public law which is not 
determined or predicated on actual damages to the [g]overnnment.”). 
 123. Id. at 1246.  
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damages caused by the defendant.”124 Ultimately, the Tenth 
Circuit concluded that the restorative injunction at issue could 
not be considered a penalty.125 Consequently, the court 
determined that the government’s claim for injunctive relief was 
not barred by § 2462.126 Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit decided 
that the concurrent remedy rule did not apply in the instant 
case.127 In doing so, the court relied on the rationale espoused in 
Banks and refused to apply the concurrent remedy rule against 
the government acting in its sovereign capacity.128 
Although the Tenth Circuit’s final ruling in Telluride is 
similar to that of the Eleventh Circuit in Banks, the Telluride 
decision is significant because the Tenth Circuit’s analysis 
focuses on whether an injunction might be considered a penalty, 
rather than summarily dismissing the notion. Telluride did not 
apply a general standard, but instead chose to tackle the issue on 
a case-by-case basis. As a result, it seems possible that, under 
this standard, there may be a scenario in which equitable relief 
could be deemed a penalty, and, thus, be barred by § 2462. 
2. Fifth Circuit 
Like the Tenth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit considered whether 
an injunction could be considered a penalty under the meaning of 
§ 2462. Unlike the Tenth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit concluded in 
Securities Exchange Commission v. Bartek129 that an injunction 
                                                                                                     
 124. Id. 
 125. See id. (explaining that the “injunction does not seek compensation 
unrelated to or in excess of the damages caused by Telco’s acts”). 
 126. See id. at 1248 (“Based on the consideration addressed above, and in 
light of the traditional notions statute of limitations should be strictly construed 
in favor of the [g]overnment, we do not consider the [g]overnment’s request for 
injunctive relief an action for a ‘civil penalty’ barred by § 2462.”). 
 127. See id. at 1249 (concluding that the “concurrent remedy rule does not 
bar the Government’s claims for equitable relief”). 
 128. See id. at 1248 (“Specifically, the Banks [c]ourt refused to apply the 
concurrent remedy rule based on the principles that a suit by the United States 
in its governmental capacity is not subject to a time limitation unless Congress 
explicitly imposes one . . . .”). 
 129. 484 Fed. App’x 949 (5th Cir. 2012). 
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was a penalty, and therefore, § 2462 controlled claims for both 
equitable and legal relief.130 
In Bartek, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
filed a complaint on June 30, 2008, charging the defendants—
officers of the company Microtune—with fraud.131 The charges 
related to questionable stock dating practices exercised by the 
defendants from 2000 to 2003.132 In its original complaint, the 
SEC sought “civil penalties, . . . permanent injunctions and officer 
and director bars against the defendants.”133 Both parties filed 
motions for summary judgment, and the district court granted 
the defendants’ motion, which asked that all forms of relief be 
barred by the statute of limitations found in § 2462.134 In doing 
so, the district court ruled that § 2462 barred the SEC’s claim for 
injunctive relief in addition to the legal remedies at issue.135  
In Bartek, the Fifth Circuit primarily considered when the 
§ 2462 statute of limitations accrues in a fraud action.136 The 
court, however, also reviewed whether the district court erred in 
deciding that § 2462 barred claims for injunctive relief.137 The 
                                                                                                     
 130. See id. at 957 (“Based on the severity and permanent nature of the 
sought-after [equitable] remedies, the district court did not [err] in denying the 
SEC’s request on grounds that the remedies are punitive, and are thus subject 
to § 2462’s time limitations.”). 
 131. See id. at 951 (“The SEC filed its original Complaint on June 30, 
2008 . . . . The SEC alleged that the Defendants committed fraud.”). 
 132. See id. at 950 (“The SEC alleges that from 2000 to 2003, the 
Defendants improperly backdated stock options that the company granted to 
newly hired and existing employees and executives.”). 
 133. Id. 
 134. See id. at 951 (“The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment 
on various issues including a statute of limitations defense . . . . The district 
court granted summary judgment to the Defendants on statute of limitations 
grounds.”). 
 135. See id. (“All forms of relief were found to be penalties under § 2462, and 
thus subject to its time limitations.”).  
 136. The Supreme Court recently decided this issue, ruling in Gabelli v. 
SEC that the statute of limitations contained in § 2462 accrues for a fraud 
action at the time the fraud is committed, not at the time the fraud is 
discovered. See Gabelli v. SEC, 133 S. Ct. 1216, 1224 (2013) (“Given the lack of 
textual, historical, or equitable reasons to graft a discovery rule onto the statute 
of limitations of § 2462, we decline to do so.”). 
 137. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s 
analysis in Bartek). 
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appellate court first cited the district court’s rationale for 
concluding, as a matter of law, that the officer–director bars and 
injunctive relief were penalties under § 2462.138 The district court 
concluded that these claims for relief were penalties, stating that 
“these remedies would have significant collateral consequences to 
the Defendants; they do not address the past harm caused by the 
Defendants; and the remedies do not focus on preventing future 
harm due to the low likelihood that the Defendants would engage 
in similar harmful behavior in the future.”139 
The appellate court then considered many possible 
definitions for the term “penalty,” all of which focused on the 
punitive nature of the remedy.140 The SEC argued that the term 
“penalty” should be construed narrowly to include only sanctions 
involving money and property.141 The appellate court, however, 
concluded that “penalty,” as used in § 2462, should be interpreted 
broadly to include a wide variety of punishments.142 The court 
determined that “whether an injunction here is a ‘penalty’ or 
simply remedial requires a look at the nature or characteristic of 
the injunction.”143 Ultimately, after considering the nature of the 
injunction at issue, the appellate court decided that the district 
court had not erred in determining that the injunction was a 
penalty as a matter of law.144 For these reasons, the appellate 
court affirmed the district court’s decision to subject the SEC’s 
                                                                                                     
 138. See SEC v. Bartek, 484 Fed. App’x 949, 956 (5th Cir. 2012) (“The 
[district] court denied the request finding that injunctive relief and O/D bars, as 
a matter of law, are construed as penalties . . . .”). 
 139. Id. 
 140. See id. (listing various legal definitions for the term “penalty”). 
 141. See id. (“The SEC cites various authorities to argue that § 2462 is 
limited to a sanction that involves the collecting of money or property.”). 
 142. See id. at 957 (“The term ‘penalty’ is not strictly used for monetary or 
property sanctions but rather encompasses a variety of punishments (e.g. death 
penalty). The SEC’s narrow interpretation is incorrect.”). 
 143. Id. 
 144. See id. (“The SEC’s sought-after remedies would have a stigmatizing 
effect and long-lasting repercussions . . . . Here, the SEC is essentially seeking a 
lifetime ban against the Defendants. Courts have held that such long term bans 
can be construed as punitive.”). 
2474 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2449 (2013) 
claims for injunctive relief to the statute of limitations included 
in § 2462.145 
The Fifth Circuit in Bartek, like the Tenth Circuit in 
Telluride, took a nuanced approach to the question of whether 
§ 2462 applies to claims for injunctive and legal relief. The court 
rejected the notion that injunctions could not be construed as 
penalties per se. By finding that the injunctive relief sought by 
the SEC had punitive qualities, the court opened the door for 
§ 2462 to control certain types of injunctions, dependent upon the 
specific characteristics of the individual claim. If Bartek’s 
rationale is accepted, § 2462 would control certain injunctions 
regardless of whether the concurrent remedy rule barred them as 
well. 
IV. Analysis 
Although the circuit courts discussed in Part III differed in 
their opinions on whether § 2462 applies to claims for injunctive 
relief, each court’s analysis followed essentially the same path. 
Specifically, each court considered whether the statute, on its 
face, controlled claims for injunctive relief, or whether the 
concurrent remedy rule could be used to bar a claim for injunctive 
relief when the statute of limitation barred corresponding legal 
claims. Consequently, it is helpful to follow this same logical 
roadmap when analyzing whether § 2462 applies to claims for 
injunctive relief. 
A. Statutory Text 
While each court discussed in Part III considered, at least 
implicitly, whether the language of § 2462 directly controlled 
actions for injunctive relief, the Tenth Circuit and Fifth Circuit 
made statutory construction and interpretation the focal point of 
                                                                                                     
 145. See id. (“Based on the severity and permanent nature of the sought-
after remedies, the district court did not [err] in denying the SEC’s request on 
grounds that the remedies are punitive, and are thus subject to § 2462’s time 
limitations.”). 
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their analyses.146 In doing so, each court discussed whether the 
injunctive relief sought could be deemed a penalty and thus fall 
within the scope of the statute.147 This approach, however, is 
incomplete. In order to determine whether the statute of 
limitations contained in § 2462 applies to claims for injunctive 
relief, courts must study the fundamental characteristics of 
injunctions and decide whether such relief qualifies as a civil fine, 
penalty, or forfeiture within the meaning of the statute. When a 
court conducts this mode of analysis, it is imperative that it 
interprets § 2462 strictly because it is a statute of limitation 
applied against the government.148 
1. Characteristics of Injunctive Relief 
The injunction is the quintessential form of equitable 
relief.149 An injunction differs from forms of legal relief because of 
its coercive nature.150 This means that an injunction is “intended 
to force the defendant to act or cease from acting in specified 
ways.”151 To accomplish this goal, injunctions act against the 
person, or in personam.152 Courts enforce these personal orders 
with their power to hold an individual who disregards an 
injunction in contempt, which is an exertion of the court’s power 
over the “person” of a defendant.153 In this way, the in personam 
                                                                                                     
 146. See supra Part III.C.1–2 (discussing those courts’ analysis). 
 147. See supra notes 119–28, 138–45 (discussing the circuit courts’ analyses 
of the nature of injunctions). 
 148. See supra Part II.C (discussing the concept of sovereign immunity). 
 149. See DOBBS, supra note 30, at 9 (“The damages remedy was historically a 
legal remedy. The injunction and most other coercive remedies were 
equitable.”). 
 150. See id. at 49 (“Most often, however, equitable remedies are coercive. 
The coercive remedies in equity are variants of the injunction.”). 
 151. Id. at 51. 
 152. See id. at 49 (“Variations on the injunctive remedy will quickly appear. 
The essence of the remedy in most instances, however, is the in personam order, 
enforced by the distinctive power of contempt.”). 
 153. See id. (“These coercive remedies were distinctive. They were enforced 
by the power of contempt if necessary. That is, the defendant might be fined or 
imprisoned for failure to comply with the order and might be held in prison until 
he complied or indicated a willingness to do so.”). 
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nature of an injunction distinguishes it from other forms of relief 
historically available at law.154 
Another important characteristic of injunctive relief stems 
from its role as the preferred remedy of courts at Chancery, 
which were primarily concerned with reaching just results.155 
Consequently, although injunctions are intended to force a person 
to act in a certain way, they are not generally considered punitive 
in nature.156 It is important to remember that although an 
injunction will likely cause a party hardship, this does not mean 
it is fundamentally punitive.157 Instead, injunctions are 
considered remedial in nature.158 
In sum, courts must consider the fact that injunctions act in 
personam and are historically remedial—as opposed to punitive—
in nature when they consider whether § 2462 controls claims for 
injunctive relief. 
2. Fines and Injunctive Relief 
According to the text of § 2462, the statute of limitations 
controls “an action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any 
civil fine.”159 Thus, if an injunction can be considered a civil fine, 
the statute of limitations will control it. A fine is defined as a 
“pecuniary criminal punishment or civil penalty payable to the 
                                                                                                     
 154. See id. (“The old separate law courts did not issue injunctive orders; 
they rendered judgments instead. The law courts did not seek to enforce their 
orders by contempt powers, but by seizure of property.”). 
 155. See id. at 55 (“Equity is said to be flexible rather than rigid, its interest 
justice rather than the law.”). 
 156. See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) (“The historic 
injunctive process was designed to deter, not to punish.”). 
 157. See United States v. Telluride Co., 146 F.3d 1241, 1247 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(“Telco’s belief the sanctions is costly or painful does not make it punitive. If the 
determination of whether a sanction is a penalty was made from the defendant’s 
perspective, then virtually every sanction would be considered a penalty since 
‘even remedial sanctions carry the sting of punishment.’” (quoting United States 
v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447 n.7 (1989) (citations omitted))). 
 158. See Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 435 (1945) 
(stating that “relief in equity is remedial, not penal”). 
 159. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2012) (emphasis added). 
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public treasury.”160 This definition contrasts with the traditional 
characteristics of injunctions in two significant ways.  
First, a fine is “pecuniary” and “payable to the county 
treasury.”161 This language clearly denotes that fines are 
monetary in nature. As discussed above, injunctions are forms of 
relief that typically operate in personam.162 This signifies that 
while a fine operates against a person’s property, an injunction 
operates against a person’s “person.” Therefore, because fines and 
injunctions function in two completely different manners, courts 
must consider them distinct forms of relief.  
Second, a fine is defined as a “criminal punishment” or “civil 
penalty”—language that denotes that fines are punitive in 
nature.163 This characteristic is a stark contrast from the 
injunction’s role as a form of remedial relief.164 Because fines are 
inherently punitive in nature, while injunctions are traditionally 
remedial, the two must be categorized as distinct forms of relief. 
Thus, a fine is a punitive remedy that is monetary in nature, 
while an injunction is a form of remedial relief that acts in 
personam. These two remedies are fundamentally at odds; 
consequently, courts should not consider an injunction a fine for 
the purpose of § 2462. 
3. Penalties and Injunctive Relief 
a. General Penalties 
The statute of limitations contained in § 2462 pertains to an 
action for the enforcement of any “penalty.”165 A penalty is 
generally defined as a punishment imposed upon a wrongdoer, 
either in the form of imprisonment or a fine.166 Therefore, a 
                                                                                                     
 160. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 708 (9th ed. 2009). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Supra Part IV.A.1. 
 163. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (defining the term “fine”).  
 164. See supra Part IV.A.1 (exploring the characteristics of injunctive relief). 
 165. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2012). 
 166. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1247 (9th ed. 2009) (“Punishment imposed 
on a wrongdoer, [usually] in the form of imprisonment or fine; [especially] a sum 
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penalty, by definition, is punitive in nature. This characterization 
of a penalty clearly differs from the injunction’s characterization 
as remedial relief.167 Moreover, penalties are traditional forms of 
legal relief, while injunctions are traditional forms of equitable 
relief.168 For these reasons, an injunction should not be 
considered a type of penalty for the purposes of § 2462.  
Courts are prone to make mistakes when they consider 
whether injunctions are penalties for the purposes of § 2462. 
Indeed, both the Tenth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit undertook 
this question in their analyses of whether § 2462 barred claims 
for injunctive relief.169 Only the Tenth Circuit, however, correctly 
concluded that the injunction at issue was not a penalty for the 
purposes of the statute.170 In its decision in Bartek, the Fifth 
Circuit decided that injunctions that enjoined defendants from 
violating securities laws and serving as officers or directors of 
public companies were penalties under § 2462.171  
The Fifth Circuit erred by interpreting the definition of 
penalty broadly, even though statutes of limitations against the 
government should receive a strict construction.172 Additionally, 
                                                                                                     
of money exacted as punishment for either a wrong to the state or a civil wrong 
(as distinguished from compensation for the injured party’s loss.”). 
 167. See supra Part IV.A.1 (exploring the characteristics of injunctive relief). 
 168. See George P. Roach, A Default Rule of Omnipotence: Implied 
Jurisdiction and Exaggerated Remedies in Equity for Federal Agencies, 12 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1, 19 (2007) (“The assessment of penalties or the 
application of punitive statutory provisions are not remedies in equity but 
rather remedies at law.”). 
 169. See supra Part III.C.1–2 (exploring the Tenth and Fifth Circuits’ 
analyses of the issue). 
 170. See Telluride Co. v. United States, 146 F.3d 1241, 1246 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(“Consistent with our definition, the restorative injunction in this case is not a 
penalty because it seeks to restore only the wetlands damaged by Telco’s acts to 
the status quo or to create new wetlands for those that cannot be restored.”). 
 171. See SEC v. Bartek, 484 Fed. App’x 949, 957 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Based on 
the severity and permanent nature of the sought-after remedies, the district 
court did not [err] in denying the SEC’s request on grounds that the remedies 
are punitive, and are thus subject to § 2462’s time limitations.”).  
 172. See id. at 956 (“The SEC cites various authority to argue that § 2462 is 
limited to a sanction that involves the collecting of money or property. These 
authorities do not limit the term ‘penalty’ to the narrower definition that the 
SEC suggests.”). But see supra Part II.C.2 (arguing that § 2462 should be 
construed narrowly because it is a statute of limitation acting against the 
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the Fifth Circuit misinterpreted the Supreme Court’s statement 
that “even remedial sanctions carry the sting of punishment” 
when it decided whether the injunction in question was a 
penalty.173 This statement, when considered in light of the 
traditional view of injunctions as nonpunitive relief, stands for 
the proposition that even though injunctions are typically 
remedial, their mandates may cause the affected party some 
degree of hardship.174 This statement does not mean that some 
injunctions should be classified as a penalty, as this 
interpretation completely contradicts one of the central 
characteristics of injunctive relief. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit 
wrongly confused an injunction’s coercive power to affect personal 
behavior with a penalty’s power to punish.  
As the Fifth Circuit displayed in its analysis in Bartek, it is 
easy to confuse the coercive power of an injunction with the 
punitive power of a penalty. Moreover, if a court erroneously 
labels an injunction as a penalty, that court will also incorrectly 
hold that § 2462 applies to injunctive relief. To avoid this result, 
courts should treat all injunctions as remedial per se, and refuse 
to engage in the case-by-case analysis advocated by the Tenth 
and Fifth Circuits. This approach will add a level of certainty to 
the issue of whether § 2462 applies to claims for injunctive relief, 
thus advancing one of the main public policy objectives common 
to all time restrictions.175 Furthermore, this approach also 
conforms to the notion that courts should strictly construe the 
terms of a statute of limitation applied against the government. 
b. Civil Penalties 
While the Tenth and Fifth Circuits considered whether an 
injunction could generally be considered a penalty and therefore 
                                                                                                     
government). 
 173. Id. at 957 (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447 n.7 
(1989)). 
 174. See supra note 157 and accompanying text (discussing the falsity of 
considering an injunction punitive in nature). 
 175. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (describing the main policy 
objectives of time bars). 
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subject to the statute of limitations contained in § 2462, there is 
another possible reading of the statute that gives the term 
“penalty” an alternate meaning. Specifically, if courts construe 
“civil” to modify “penalty,” then § 2462 would control claims for 
injunctive relief if the court deemed an injunction a civil 
penalty.176 
A civil penalty is a “fine assessed for a violation of a statute 
or regulation.”177 Although courts have disagreed over whether 
injunctions can generally be considered penalties, jurisdictions 
agree that civil penalties are traditionally legal remedies.178 
Because injunctions are the quintessential form of equitable 
relief, an injunction cannot be a civil penalty. Therefore, if courts 
construe the language of § 2462 to include civil penalties, the 
statute cannot bar claims for injunctive relief.179 
                                                                                                     
 176. See 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2012)  
Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an action, suit or 
proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, 
pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be entertained unless commenced 
within five years from the date when the claim first accrued if, within 
the same period, the offender or the property is found within the 
United States in order that proper service may be made thereon. 
 177. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1247 (9th ed. 2009). 
 178. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 421 (1987)  
A civil penalty was a type of remedy at common law that could only 
be enforced in courts of law. Remedies intended to punish culpable 
individuals, as opposed to those intended simply to extract 
compensation or restore the status quo, were issued by courts of law, 
not courts of equity. 
See also SEC v. Lipson, 278 F.3d 656, 662 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that civil 
penalties are a legal, not equitable, form of relief). 
 179. It is worth noting that in a recent decision discussing the accrual of a 
fraud claim under § 2462, the Supreme Court referred to the SEC’s requested 
relief as a “civil penalty.” See Gabelli v. SEC, 133 S. Ct. 1216, 1219 (2013) 
(discussing the statute’s requirement that an action for a “civil penalty” be 
brought within five years from the date it first accrued). 
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4. Forfeiture and Injunctive Relief 
a. General Forfeiture 
In addition to fines and penalties, the language of § 2462 also 
controls claims for forfeitures.180 Forfeiture is defined as the 
“divestiture of property without compensation.”181 Forfeitures are 
typically penal judgments against money or property.182 Thus, 
because injunctions are typically remedial and act in personam, 
courts should not construe injunctions as a type of forfeiture for 
the purposes of § 2462. 
b. Civil Forfeiture 
Like the term “penalty,” if courts conclude that the term 
“civil” modifies “forfeiture” in the construction of § 2462, the 
statute of limitations applies to “civil forfeitures.”183 A civil 
forfeiture is “[a]n in rem proceeding brought by the government 
against property that either facilitated a crime or was acquired as 
a result of criminal activity.”184 Because injunctions are 
traditionally proceedings that act in personam, a claim for 
injunctive relief should not be considered a civil forfeiture for the 
purposes of interpretation of § 2462.  
5. Conclusion 
One possible way for the statute of limitations contained in 
§ 2462 to apply to claims for injunctive relief is for courts to 
conclude that injunctions fall within the forms of relief contained 
within the text of the statute. Namely, courts must construe 
injunctive relief as a civil fine, a penalty, or a forfeiture. If courts 
construe these terms strictly, they should find that injunctive 
                                                                                                     
 180. 28 U.S.C. § 2642. 
 181. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 722 (9th ed. 2009).  
 182. See id. (“Something ([especially] money or property) lost or confiscated 
by this process; a penalty.”). 
 183. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2012). 
 184. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 722 (9th ed. 2009). 
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relief, due to its remedial and in personam characteristics, falls 
outside the definitions of these terms. Consequently, § 2462 does 
not bar actions for injunctive relief based on a facial analysis of 
the statutory terms. 
B. Concurrent Remedy Rule 
When courts conclude that the text of the statute of 
limitations contained in § 2462 does not bar claims for injunctive 
relief, they should then consider whether the concurrent remedy 
rule bars such claims. The concurrent remedy rule stands for the 
proposition that “equity will withhold its relief in such a case 
where the applicable statute of limitations would bar the 
concurrent legal remedy.”185 As discussed above, this doctrine 
simply supports the notion that a court’s dismissal of a legal 
claim due to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations 
is strong evidence supporting a court’s decision to dismiss a 
corresponding equitable claim due to the doctrine of laches.186 
Moreover, the concurrent remedy rule does not state that a 
statute of limitations should directly control claims for equitable 
relief, including injunctions.187 In this way, both the Eleventh 
Circuit and the Ninth Circuit applied the concurrent remedy rule 
in error when considering whether the statute of limitations in 
§ 2462 barred claims for injunctive relief.188 
In Banks, the Eleventh Circuit failed to apply the concurrent 
remedy rule to the analysis of whether § 2462 bars claims for 
                                                                                                     
 185. Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 464 (1947). 
 186. See supra Part II.B (examining the nature of the concurrent remedy 
rule). 
 187. Supra Part II.B. 
 188. This subpart focuses on the analysis conducted by the Eleventh Circuit 
in Banks and the Ninth Circuit in Williams. In Telluride, the Tenth Circuit 
chose to follow the Eleventh Circuit’s line of reasoning in Banks when 
discussing the concurrent remedy rule. See United States v. Telluride Co., 146 
F.3d 1241, 1249 (10th Cir. 1998) (“For the same reasons applied in Banks, we 
conclude the concurrent remedy rule does not bar the Government’s claims for 
equitable relief.”). Consequently, the analysis of the Eleventh Circuit’s 
reasoning can be applied to the Tenth Circuit. Additionally, in Bartek, the Fifth 
Circuit failed to consider the concurrent remedy rule in its analysis of § 2462. 
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit is omitted from this discussion. 
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injunctive relief.189 In doing so, the court focused on the fact that 
“‘[t]raditionally, ‘statutes of limitation are not controlling 
measures of equitable relief.’”190 Although this is true, it is also 
immaterial, as the concurrent remedy rule does not stand for the 
proposition that a statute of limitation should directly control 
claims for equitable relief. Additionally, the court refuses to apply 
the concurrent remedy rule to its analysis because “‘an action on 
behalf of the United States in its governmental capacity . . . is 
subject to no time limitation, in the absence of congressional 
enactment clearly imposing it.’”191 Finally, the court refused to 
apply the concurrent remedy rule because “any statute of 
limitations sought to be applied against the United States ‘must 
receive a strict construction in favor of the Government.’”192 It is 
possible, however, to give these tenets of statutory construction 
their full effect and still apply the concurrent remedy rule. 
Even applying a strict construction to the statute of 
limitation contained in § 2462, it is clear that Congress intended 
the provision to be applied against the government.193 Because 
the statute of limitations of § 2462 applies against the 
government, its expiration can be used as evidence that a laches 
claim would also bar any concurrent claims for equitable relief. 
Thus, the concurrent remedy rule applies in this situation.  
The application of the concurrent remedy rule, however, does 
not complete the analysis. Even though the concurrent remedy 
rule holds that a laches claim would technically be proper, the 
defense of laches should not be used against the government to 
bar injunctive relief under § 2462.194 Therefore, even though the 
concurrent remedy rule applies, actions for injunctive relief are 
                                                                                                     
 189. See United States v. Banks, 115 F.3d 916, 919 (11th Cir. 1997) (“We 
conclude, therefore, that the concurrent remedy rule cannot properly be invoked 
against the government when it seeks equitable relief in its official enforcement 
capacity.”). 
 190. Id. (quoting Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946)). 
 191. Id. (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 456, 462 
(1944); United States v. Alvarado, 5 F.3d 1425, 1427 (11th Cir. 1993)). 
 192. Id. (quoting Alvarado, 5. F.3d at 1427). 
 193. See supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text (discussing the 
government’s intent in passing § 2462). 
 194. See supra notes 71–73 (discussing whether laches should be applied 
against the government). 
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not barred by § 2462. The Eleventh Circuit reached the correct 
result, but did so through an incorrect logical analysis. 
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit applied an improper analysis of 
the concurrent remedy rule in Williams.195 When the court 
applied the concurrent remedy rule in Williams, it stated that 
“because the claim for injunctive relief is connected to the claim 
for legal relief, the statute of limitations applies to both.”196 As 
discussed above, the concurrent remedy rule does not state that 
the statute of limitations applies to both claims for legal and 
equitable relief.197 Thus, the court applied the concurrent remedy 
rule incorrectly and failed to recognize that the expiration of the 
statute of limitations for a legal claim is evidence of laches, which 
cannot be applied against the government. 
In sum, the concurrent remedy rule technically applies to 
§ 2462 as evidence that a laches claim is proper when 
corresponding legal claims are barred. Injunctive relief, however, 
should not be barred because laches should not be applied against 
the government under § 2462. 
V. Recommendations 
The statute of limitations contained in § 2462 applies only 
against the U.S. government.198 Consequently, courts must 
construe the terms of this statute strictly.199 When courts apply 
this mode of analysis, they will find that injunctive relief, due to 
its remedial and in personam nature, does not constitute a civil 
fine, penalty, or forfeiture under the statute.200 As a result, courts 
should reject outright the notion that § 2462 may bar injunctive 
                                                                                                     
 195. See supra notes 102–04 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s 
treatment of the concurrent remedy rule). 
 196.  FEC v. Williams, 104 F.3d 237, 240 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 197. See supra Part II.B (examining the meaning of the concurrent remedy 
rule). 
 198. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of 28 
U.S.C. § 2462). 
 199. See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing the statutory construction of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2462). 
 200. See supra Parts IV.A.2–4 (examining the types of remedies discussed in 
28 U.S.C. § 2462). 
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relief depending on the characteristics of the individual 
injunction. In doing so, courts will provide a level of certainty to 
litigants and advance public policies common to all time 
restrictions by fostering consistent and predictable decisions.201 
Furthermore, courts should generally apply the concurrent 
remedy rule in all actions where they have the power to grant 
both legal and equitable relief.202 When courts apply this rule, 
they should treat the expiration of the applicable statute of 
limitations as evidence that an action for laches is proper.203 Even 
though the concurrent remedy rule should normally bar actions 
for injunctive relief when the corresponding statute of limitation 
expires, courts must extend their analyses one step further and 
conclude that the defense of laches should not be used against the 
government under § 2462.204 Thus, courts should rule that § 2462 
does not bar claims for injunctive relief, advancing the 
fundamental policy that no time bars should run against the 
government unless Congress expresses a clear intention for them 
to do so.205 
  
                                                                                                     
 201. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text (discussing public policy 
benefits of time bars). 
 202. See supra Part II.B (examining the nature of concurrent jurisdiction of 
law and equity). 
 203. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the applicability of the concurrent 
remedy rule). 
 204. See supra notes 71–73 (discussing the applications of the laches 
doctrine in actions against the United States government). 
 205. See supra Part II.C (discussing sovereign immunity). 
